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STUDENT COMMENTS
ROE INSON-PATMAN ACT, SECTION 2(d):
THE EXPANDED DEFINITION OF
"CUSTOMER"
During the 1920's and 1930's, a new form of business organization, the
chain store, threatened to capture a substantial portion of the food distribu-
tion market from traditional independent retailers and wholesalers. 1 Chain
stores attained wide popular acceptance because their lower costs enabled
them to sell products at lower prices than their independent competitors. 2
The chains were able to keep their costs low because of a number of inno-
vations which they introduced in production, purchasing, and marketing. 3
Some of these innovations by chain stores were thought to give them an un-
fair advantage over their independent competitors. In an attempt to deprive
large chain stores of their unfair advantages and to prohibit some abuses
which chain stores were committing, Congress enacted legislation during this
period. One particularly abusive practice was the use which chains made of
advertising allowances. Congress attempted to eliminate discrimination in the
granting of advertising allowances by enacting Section 2(d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act. 4
This comment examines the background of section 2(d) and the statu-
tory requirements, for acceptable advertising allowances. Particular emphasis
will be placed upon an examination of the persons to whom section 2(d)
applies. This emphasis is necessary because in FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc. 5 the
Supreme Court has greatly expanded the class of merchants protected from
discriminatory advertising allowances.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 2 (d)
The success of the chains was attributed mainly to their ability to
charge lower pric:es.e The reason for these lower prices was cost savings
ascribed largely to economies of scale and special favors granted to the chains
by sellers who hoped to secure the high volume business of the chain stores.
More specifically, suppliers would charge chains lower prices for their prod-
ucts than they charged smaller retail grocers or else suppliers would grant
1 "Between 1926 and 1933 chain stores nearly tripled their share of total retail sales—
from 9 to 25 per cent.. Conversely, the business mortality of the independent retailer waxed
high, averaging about 10 per cent per year in the 1920's and 1930's." F. Rowe, Price Dis-
crimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 5 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Rowe]; see
also Edwards, The Place of Economics in the Course on Trade Regulations, 1 J. Legal
Ed. 1, 6 (1948).
2 FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1935).
3 Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, the Struggle Between Independents
and Chains, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1056 (1951).
4 15 US.C. § 13 (1964).
5 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
See FTC, Final Report, supra note 2.
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indirect and often secret price rebates to the chains.' One of the most
commonly employed types of indirect rebates was the advertising allowance. 8
Advertising allowances were payments in kind or cash, made by manu-
facturers to defray the advertising costs of their dealers.9 Theoretically, these
allowances were granted in order to expand local advertising for the manu-
facturer's product and to enable the manufacturer to control its character."
At least two serious problems arose from this practice of granting advertising
allowances.11 First, as mentioned above, manufacturers often used the guise of
advertising allowances to grant their large customers secret price rebates.
Manufacturers accomplished this purpose by allotting payments to dealers
ostensibly for advertising but without any demand, or even expectation, that
any advertising services would actually be performed by the recipients. For
example, in 1934 the A & P chain received $8,000,000 in advertising allow-
ances. In the same year, A & P spent approximately $6,000,000 for adver-
tising purposes. The difference between these two figures—$2,000,000—was
the aggregate of what were, in effect, price rebates. This $2,000,000 repre-
sented over half the net profits of the A & P for that year. 12 One effect, then,
of advertising allowances was to place small retailers who received no allow-
ances at a competitive disadvantage with the large chains.
The second problem that arose from the use of advertising allowances
was that sellers were often compelled to grant these allowances because of
pressure exerted by these larger accounts. 18 Typically, a large buyer would
7 See Rowe, supra note 1, at. 9-10; 79 Cong. Rec. 14412 (1935) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Patterson).
8 Another device employed by appellants to extract price preferences from sup-
pliers was the so-called "general advertising allowance." Such allowances con-
stituted a substantial source of preferential revenue. . .
... The record is clear that appellants, in negotiating such contracts, system-
atically avoided committing themselves to any definite advertising performance.
They desired to keep performance flexible....
... The only reasonable explanation for appellants' refusal to bind them-
selves to any additional advertising performance in return for the contribution
which they extracted from suppliers, is simply that they had no intention of
furnishing additional services. A & P's attitude toward these concessions is accu-
rately reflected by the fact that appellants originally referred to them as "rebates."
The term "advertising allowance" was adopted in 1927 because the Divisional
Purchasing Directors thought that the "term covered the situation well".. . .
Brief for Respondent at 36-38, United States v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949). See also the statements made by H. B. Teegarden, draftsman of the
original Patman Bill, during Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee. He stated
that advertising allowances were one of the primary "methods under which price con-
cessions and discriminations granted to buying organizations are principally practiced
in the experience of the trade." Hearings on H.R. 8442, H.R. 4995, H.R. 5062 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary [hereinafter cited as 1935 Hearings], 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
16 (1935).
9 See Fulda, supra note 3, at 1084.
10 Id.
11 For a general discussion of the problems in the practice of granting advertising
allowances see id. at 1086.
12 79 Cong. Rec. 12020 (1930 (remarks of Representative Patman).
13 "[B]uying power is the source of the evil. The seller is merely an innocent vic-
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coerce a comparably smaller seller into granting such concessions by threaten-
ing to withdraw his purchase order. 14 The advertising allowances for Fleisch-
man's Yeast in 1935 dramatically illustrate this problem. For the purchase of
Fleischman's product, the manufacturer granted advertising allowances only
to A & P and Kroger, two national chain stores. This practice meant that
250,000 other retailers of Fleischman's Yeast who received no allowance or
rebate were put at a decided disadvantage when it came to selling this prod-
uct.15 The inequity involved in the favoritism employed in granting advertis-
ing allowances assumes an even greater magnitude when viewed along with
the fact that, even if the advertising services were actually rendered, the large
buyers' own advertising expenses were being defrayed to the extent of the
allowance. This meant that his costs were less than the smaller retailers' who
received no such reimbursement. 16
In order to deal with the inequities of advertising allowances, Congress
incorporated Section 2(d) into the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2(d)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay
or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the
benefit of a customer of such a person in the course of such com-
merce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facil-
ities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or
commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person,
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally
equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of
such products or commodities.'?
This section is aimed at eliminating discrimination in favor of the large
buyers.'s It prohibits manufacturers from granting advertising allowances
tim, compelled usually in self-defense to grant the concessions demanded." 1935 Hearings,
supra note 8, at 31.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir.
1949).
15 Fulda, supra note 3, at 1087-88.
18 "The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is, of course, the grant
of discriminations under the guise of payments for advertising and promotional services
which, whether or not the services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an advan-
tage to the customer so favored as compared with others who have to bear the cost of
such services themselves." 80 Cong. Rec. 9418 (1936) (remarks of Representative Utter-
back).
17 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964). The Robinson-Patman Act, as an amendment of the
Clayton Act, was necessary because "[Me price discrimination provisions of Section
2 of the original Clayton Act of 1914 proved impotent to curb excessive concessions
secured by chain buyers in competition with independent merchants." Rowe, supra note
1, at 6.
18 Rowe, supra note 1, at 365. By its terms § 2(d) technically applies only to
sellers. However, the courts, realizing that many discriminatory advertising allowances
are induced by strong buyers, avoided this technicality by ruling that § 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act may be invoked against buyers who induce sellers to
violate § 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 5 makes any quInfair methods of
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices" unlawful. 15 U,S.C.
§ 45(a) (1964). Thus, the courts have held that acts of inducing a seller to violate
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solely to select customers; if any allowances are granted, they must be made
available to all the competing customers of the supplier." The legality of
an advertising allowance depends upon whether it is available on proportion-
ally equal terms to all customers competing in the distribution of the product
for which the allowance is granted.
A. Availability.
The element of availability is a dual concept, requiring both notice and
practicability. 2° To comply with this standard the seller must, first, inform
all his customers of his policy of granting advertising allowances and, second,
fashion this advertising program to be within the economic grasp of even his
smallest buyer. 21 If one form of allowance cannot meet these tests,. it is
necessary to offer alternative, programs that can be utilized by even the
smallest competing customer.22 For example, a seller could not offer advertis-
ing subsidies solely on the occasion of new store openings, because not every-
one opens new stores; 23 nor could a seller make an offer for advertising
allowances limited strictly to payment of television advertising costs if he had
small buyers who could not afford television time. In such cases, the seller
would be required to make alternative allowances, such as newspaper adver-
tising or handbills, available to small buyers. 24
B. Proportionate Equality
Besides satisfying the requirement of availability, a supplier must meet
the second criterion: the advertising allowances must be proportionally equal.
"Proportionate equality" is a highly elusive concept. 25 Generally, it requires
that both large and small buyers receive their fair shares of advertising allow-
ances.26 Large buyers may receive greater allotments because they render
more elaborate services and advertise on a larger scale. Allowances, however,
§ 2(d) are "Tuinfair methods of competition." By so doing, the courts have effectively
brought buyers within the proscription of § 2(d). See Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300
F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962).
19 Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and
Services; Compliance with Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Clayton Act, as Amended by
The Robinson-Patman Act [hereinafter cited as FTC Guides], 16 C.F.R. § 240.9 (1967) ;
see Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 288, 302 (1944), aff'd, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
20 Millstein, Sections 2(d) and (e) Robinson-Patman Act—Compulsory Universal
Reciprocity?, 37 Antitrust L.J. 77, 91 (1968) ; 1 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 3800, at 6011.
21 "To meet the availability test, a promotional payment or service must both be
communicated to all those competing in the resale of the supplier's product and be within
their reach as an economic matter." Manual of Federal Trade Regulations Affecting Re-
tailers 32 (J. Bliss & I. Millstein eds. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Bliss & Millstein]; see
also Austern, Difficult and Diffusive Decades: An 'Historical Plaint about the Robinson-
Patman Act, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. Sc?, 906 (1966).
22 Bliss & Millstein, supra note 21, at 32.
23 Millstein, supra note 20, at 92.
24 Bliss & Millstein, supra note 21, at 32; see also FTC Guides, supra note 19, § 240.9
(example 1).
25 See Rowe, supra note 1, at 399 & n.160.
26 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co,, 150 F.2d 988, 994-95 (8th Cir,
1945).
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must not be limited to large customers on the ground that they alone can
furnish the kind of services desired by the seller. Smaller retailers must also
receive some allowance, even though the amount of the allowances may be
smaller because they perform less valuable advertising services for the supplier
or because they purchase fewer products. The basic premise of proportionate
equality is that all customers who distribute the manufacturer's product are
entitled to a proportional share of the allowance. The underlying theory is
that the advertising service which a small buyer provides, while perhaps less
extensive than his larger competitors', still does provide product exposure
and consequently is valuable to the supplier. 27
During the course of congressional debate on the Robinson-Patman Act.
one Senator illustrated his understanding of the term "proportionate equality"
by this example: "If one man buys $100,000 in goods and should be allowed
$1,000 for advertising purposes, and another buys $10,000 in goods, he ought
to be allowed $100 for advertising." 28 This statement conveys the general
meaning of the phrase better than most attempts at specific definition."
C. Competing Customers
The third requirement of section 2 (d) specifies the persons to whom
proportionally equal allowances must be made available. It is perhaps the
most important of all the requirements. Oddly enough, however, it has re-
ceived the least treatment by the courts. Under section 2 (d) manufacturers
who grant advertising allowances are required to offer them to all their
"customers competing in the distribution ... of such products. . . . 3 '2°
Most past decisions which have interpreted this phrase have turned on
the definition of "competing" rather than on the definition of "customer."
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has stated that customers do not com-
pete when they do not deal with the same consumers because of geographical
separation.81 In addition to unity of place, the Commission has insisted on unity
of time between the isolated purchases of the allegedly favored and disfavored
customers. Thus, if a substantial period of time has elapsed between Buyer A's
purchase and Buyer B's, the FTC will not consider them to be competing cus-
tomers under the statute."
The meaning of the word "customer," on the other hand, has received
little attention. In the FTC's Guides, a customer was defined as "someone
who buys directly from the seller or his agent or broker." 38 Until very recently,
this interpretation was never seriously questioned by the courts. However,
27 See 1935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 38.
28 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Senator Logan) .
29 See, e.g., FTC Guides, 16 C.F.R. § 240.7. Here the Commission has said that the
term proportional equality "means that payments or services must be proportionalized on
some basis that is fair to all customers who compete."
3° 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964).
81 FTC Guides, 16 C.F.R. § 240.12.
32 See, e.g., Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958). The Com-
mission has indicated, however, that the requirement of unity of time may be met in
the case where "there is a showing of continuous sales of regularly promoted items."
Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, C1963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. V 16,666, at
21,552-53 (FTC 1963).
33 FTC Guides, 16 C.F.R. § 240.3.
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32 years after the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court, in FTC v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 34
 not only questioned the FTC's interpretation of "cus-
tomer" but essentially rewrote the definition to embody an entirely novel
meaning." The remainder of this comment will investigate the background
and validity of the Court's expanded definition of "customer" and will
examine the implications of this new meaning.
II. Meyer's REDEFINITION OF "CUSTOMER"
Fred Meyer, Inc. operated thirteen supermarkets in the Portland, Oregon
area. These stores were principally engaged in the sale of retail merchandise
including groceries, drugs, variety items and a limited line of clothing.
Annually, Meyer sponsored a four-week promotional campaign featuring
"coupon books." The coupon books entitled consumers to price reductions
on the items illustrated within. These books were purchased by Meyer's
customers for the nominal price of ten cents per book. This campaign was
underwritten by manufacturers who paid Meyer $350 for a coupon-page
illustrating their product. The sum of these $350 contributions more than
covered Meyer's costs of publishing, distributing and publicizing the books.
In addition, many suppliers also granted Meyer price reductions on their
products sold during the campaign, provided free stock replacements or
redeemed the coupons at face value.
When this promotional campaign was conducted in 1957, both Tri-Valley
Packing Association and Idaho Canning Company purchased pages in Meyer's
coupon book. These particular coupon-pages entitled Meyer's customers to
three cans of the suppliers' products for the price of two. To defray further
Meyer's cost in such an offering, both suppliers also agreed to supply Meyer,
free of charge, with replacements for every third can of their products sold
as a part of this campaign. In effect, it cost Meyer nothing to offer his cus-
tomers three cans of these products for the price of two.
Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning did not sell directly to any retailers besides
Meyer in the Portland area. They did, however, sell to various wholesalers
in that area. Two of these wholesalers, Hudson House and Wadhams Com-
pany, sold to independent retailers who were in direct competition with Meyer.
Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning did not offer Hudson and Wadhams or any
Portland area retailers an advertising allowance similar to that offered to
Meyer.
Because Meyer was the only Portland area retailer who received allow-
ances under this advertising campaign, the FTC brought an action against
Meyer in which it ruled that Meyer had (1) violated Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act" by engaging in unfair methods of competition, by
34 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
35 Id. at 364 (dissenting opinion).
36 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964). It has been suggested that the best method of handling
cases where the buyer does not come strictly within the literal confines of the Robinson-
Patman Act is to treat the buyer as solely violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. By so doing, the court embodies the objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act
into the concept of unfair competition contained in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. See Eine Kleine Juristische Schlummergeschichte, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 933
(1966). Compare Max Factor & Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep .
¶ 16,992, at 22,066 (FTC 1964), with Foremost Dairies, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1480 (1956).
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knowingly inducing discriminatory advertising allowances in violation of
Section 2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act37
 and (2) violated Section 2 (f)
of the Robinson-Patman Aces by knowingly inducing direct price discrimina-
tions prohibited by Section 2 (a) 39 of the same Act.
In order to constitute discrimination under section 2 (d), a course of
conduct must result in different treatment to "competing customers." In
deciding whether there was discrimination in Meyer, the Commission was faced
with a dilemma. On the one hand, Hudson House and \Vadhams, being whole-
salers, did not "compete" with Meyer, a retailer, in the resale of the goods."
On the other hand, the retailers who did compete with Meyer did not purchase
directly from the manufacturers who gave allowances and, hence, were not
direct customers of the manufacturers. In short, the customers of the donors
of the allowances were not in competition with the recipients, and the mer-
chants who competed with the recipients were not customers of the donors.
Apparently, then, the allowances granted to Meyer were technically
within the law41
 even though their effect was to give Meyer an advantage
over his competitors. The FTC, however, placed substance over form, and
ruled against Meyer. In so doing it reversed its earlier decisions and held that
wholesalers like Hudson and Wadhams did in fact compete with retailers
like Meyer because all were involved in the distribution of Tri-Valley peaches
and Idaho Canning corn. 42
 Consequently, the $350 advertising allowances
paid by these suppliers to Meyer violated Section 2 (d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act because proportionally equal shares were not made available to
the two wholesalers, Hudson and Wadhams.
One Commissioner dissented in part, arguing that the retailers, who
competed directly with Meyer in the resale of the products, would be most
directly injured. Thus, he contended that the retailers rather than the whole-
salers should be treated as "customers" of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning and
that the retailers should be entitled to proportionally equal shares of the
advertising allowances."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit modified the Commission's
decision in part. The court held that a section 2 (d) violation had not been
shown since Meyer's competitors were not customers of Tri-Valley and Tri-
Valley's customers, the wholesalers, were not competitors of Meyer." The
37 15	 § 13(d) (1964).
38 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964).
39 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
49 Prior to the Fred Meyer case, the Commission had seemingly adopted the posi-
tion that customers not on the same functional level do not compete with each other.(Func-
tional level, as used here, means status or position in the distribution system of manu-
facturer, wholesaler and retailer.) See Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 566 (1956).
rev'd on other grounds, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 56
F.T.C. 215 (1959).
41 Under § 2(d), manufacturers who grant advertising allowances are only required
to offer them to their "customers competing in the distribution of [their] products or
commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964).
42 See note 40 supra; Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg.
Rep. ¶ 16,368, at 21,214-15 (FTC 1963).
43 Fred Meyer, Inc., 11961-1963 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. if 16,368, at 21,231
(FTC 1963) (Commissioner Elman, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44 Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 359 (1966).
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court found that, while Meyer and Hudson House and Wadhams were
"customers" of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning, they were not "competing
customers" because they operated on a different functional level. On the
other hand, the retailers who did compete with Meyer were not customers
of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning under the statute since they purchased the
products through wholesalers and not directly from the manufacturers."
On February 13, 1967, the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to
the question: "Whether a supplier's granting to a retailer who buys directly
from it promotional allowances that are not made available to a wholesaler
who resells to retailers competing with the direct-buying retailer violates
Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act." 46
In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the Court held that retailers
who purchase a manufacturer's products through wholesalers are "customers"
of the manufacturer for the purposes of Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Therefore, suppliers who grant promotional allowances to direct-buying
retailers must also make them available on proportionally equal terms to
retailers who buy the suppliers' products through wholesalers and then com-
pete for resales with the direct-buying retailers. 47 Further, the Court held
that direct-buying retailers and wholesalers do not compete with one another
because they are not on the same functional level of distribution."
In Meyer, the Court sets forth a novel definition of "customer," a
definition which greatly expands the number of buyers who must be offered
advertising allowances. The Court extended the meaning of the word "cus-
tomer" to include buyers not in privity with the original seller. In deciding
Meyer, the Court was faced with the choice of either giving "customer" a
novel meaning in section 2(d) or else placing small retailers outside the pro-
tection of section 2(d) in some circumstances. If the Court chose the latter
alternative it would have excluded small, indirect-buying retailers from the
protection of the Act while affording protection to large, direct-buying chain
stores. Thus, if there were another direct-buying chain in the Portland area
which competed with Meyer, it would have been entitled to advertising allow-
ances, but the independent retailers who didn't buy directly would not have
been entitled to them. Consequently, the protection of section 2 (d) would
be accorded to those chains who presumably have the economic power to take
care of themselves while it would be denied to the small retailers who, as the
Meyer case demonstrates, need the protection very strongly." Such a result
would lie in direct opposition to the congressional intent of section 2(d).
A. Meyer in the Light of Statutory Intent
The validity of the Court's novel interpretation of "customer" may be
examined, first, in the light of judicial latitude in the process of statutory
construction and, second, in the light of the force and clarity of the congres-
45 Id.
46 386 U.S. 907 (1967).
47 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 357 (1968).
48 Id. at 355-56.
49 Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. g 16,368, at
21,214-15 (FTC 1963).
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sional intent. It can be argued that the Court's action was an unwarranted
revision of legislation not within the province of the judiciary. 5° This argu-
ment rests upon the fact that what appears to be congressional intent from
an examination of pre-enactment debates is quite often different from what
the statute actually says in its final form. 5 ' To allow the judiciary too broad
discretion in reading a statute of course tampers with the constitutional sep-
aration of legislative from judicial power. Furthermore, if the courts have
such broad discretion the meaning of legislation will be unknown, arbitrary
or uncertain, and the doctrine of stare decisis with its valuable element of
predictability will be devalued.
It is submitted, however, that a closer examination of the Meyer case
reveals that in redefining "customer" the Court was not taking unwarranted
liberties. The Court did what was necessary in order to give meaning to the
statute while at the same time reaching an equitable result in the case.
Furthermore, the Court's interpretation by no means constituted a drastic
departure from prior law. In fact it marked another case in a continuous line
formed by the liberal construction of that Act by the Court. Because from its
enactment the statute has been repeatedly assailed as ambiguous52 and be-
cause the FTC and the courts have been forced to adopt strained interpreta-
tions to implement its underlying congressional intent, the rule of the Meyer
case cannot be viewed as a surprise. 55
Because of the flagrant discrimination in the Meyer case and the means
of its achievement, there is a strong public policy argument in favor of the
result reached by the Court. Testimony in the record shows that Meyer was
forcing comparably smaller sellers to participate in its advertising campaign
regardless of whether or not they desired to do so. (While Meyer's sales in
1957 were $40,000,000, Tri-Valley's were $22,000,000 and Idaho Canning's
were slightly over $1,000,000.) 54 Furthermore, as a result of these allowances
and rebates, Meyer was able to sell his products to consumers at prices lower
than what it cost his smaller competitors to stock their shelves. 55 If the Court
had allowed Meyer to continue these practices, it would have been condoning
precisely that type of activity which Congress intended the R obinson-Patrnan
Act to eliminate. Indeed, the Court based its decision on the fact that it was
implementing congressional intent. The majority opinion states that a nar-
rower reading of "customer" would be "diametrically opposed to Congress'
clearly stated intent to improve the competitive position of small retailers
by eliminating what was regarded as an abusive form of discrimination." 56
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly indicates
that Congress intended to prevent the kind of activity and the resulting
50 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. .593, 596 (1951).
51 Marchese v. United States, 126 F.2d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1942).
52 See, e.g., Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953) ; FTC v. Sun Oil
Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) ; Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges Who Can't and
Legislators Who Won't, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 787, 793-94 (1963).
53 See, e.g., Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 546 (1937) ; K.S. Corp. v
Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
54 Record at 95, FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
55 Id. at 26-27.
56 390 U.S. at 352.
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discrimination found in the Meyer case." The Act grew out of the feeling
that as a matter of public policy economic Darwinism was not desirable. 58
The bill was meant to protect independent retailers by restoring equality of
opportunity in business." To do so, the legislature attempted to insure that
the prices charged to large and small retailers would vary only because of the
relative economic efficiencies of the buyers, and attempted to eliminate price
differentials which reflect only the exercise of economic power by large
retailers." This view derives support from the reports of both the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees. The Report of the former states: "The
purpose of the proposed legislation is to restore, so far as possible, equality
of opportunity in business. . . ."81 Certainly the Meyer decision is an attempt
to restore equality between Meyer and the independents in competition with
it. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report said that the object of the bill was
"to suppress more effectually discriminations between customers of the same
seller not supported by sound economic differences in their business position
or in the cost of serving them." 52
 This statement supports the position taken
by the Court in Meyer because none of the concessions made to Meyer were
cost-justified. Consequently it can be said of Meyer that although the
Court interpreted the word "customer" so as to give it a broad meaning, the
result is consistent with the purpose of the Act.
To insure that the legislative intent to restore equality was carried out,
the Court in Meyer concentrated more on economic realities than on a literal
interpretation. Such action, rather than being a revision of legislation and a
radical departure from precedent, implements the judicial policy of construing
a statute in such a way as to carry out the congressional intent."
B. The Expansion of the Customer Concept
The Court in Meyer recognized that a manufacturer maintains a special
relationship with all merchants who deal with his product. The word "cus-
tomer," as used in common parlance, does not adequately describe the rela-
tionship because it connotes privity. For this reason, the Court was compelled
to lengthen the reach of that term. Even before Meyer, the requirement of
privity had been eroded in several Robinson-Patman decisions. Meyer simply
completed this erosion. As a recognition of the relationship which exists
between a manufacturer and all his retailers, whether they are in privity with
the manufacturer or not, and in light of the clear intent of Congress to
guarantee equal treatment to all retailers who share this relationship with a
57 See, e.g., 1935 Hearings, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 30; C. Edwards, The Price Discrimi-
nation Law 49-50 (1959) ; FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 69 (1959).
58 See 1935 Hearings, supra note 57, at 5-6; 79 Cong. Rec. 7719 (1935) (remarks of
Representative M o ritz) .
59 "The purpose was not merely to strengthen the precautionary element in the anti-
trust laws but to afford equality of opportunity to commercial buyers." C. Edwards, supra
note 57, at 29; FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520 (1963).
66 1935 Hearings, supra note 57, at 6-8, 34.
61 H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
62 S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
63 See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United
States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942).
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manufacturer, it is submitted that the Court's enlarged definition of "cus-
tomer" was both necessary and desirable.
This undefined relationship is more readily understood if one discards
privity and its concept of a one-to-one relationship applied to "customer"
in favor of the more modern approach of a "marketing system." The market-
ing system is, of course, the means by which the manufacturer transports his
product to the ultimate consumer. The final sale is the most significant to
the manufacturer because it is, after all, his motivation for initiating pro-
duction in the first place.
The special relationship between manufacturers and subsequent dealers
is not unique to Robinson-Patman Act cases. It has received recognition in
the areas of fair trade, products liability and equitable servitudes on chattels.
Under state and federal fair trade legislation, manufacturers of some goods
are allowed to set the price at which retailers may sell their products to the
public. Fair trade may apply to retailers who have purchased through whole-
salers as well as direct-buying retailers. The principal justification for fair
trade is that manufacturers require some control over retailers who distribute
their products, since they have a proprietary interest in goods carrying their
trade names or brands.° 4 Similarly the irrelevance of privity of contract has
been recognized in the area of products liability. A manufacturer is liable in
tort to remote purchasers as well as to those directly in privity with him for
harm resulting from his defective product. 65
The upholding by courts of contracts which impose equitable servitudes
on chattels is probably the most explicit recognition in the law of the rela-
tionship which all distributors share in the goods produced. An equitable servi-
tude may take the form of resale price restrictions, territorial limitations on
sales, restrictions on the form in which the article may be resold, restrictions on
the use of the chattel itself or tying restrictions involving complementary
products. These restrictions are attempts by the manufacturer to make the
intermediary transfers of title to wholesalers and retailers legally immaterial
in order that the manufacturer may retain some control over their ultimate
disposition or use."
The validity of equitable servitudes on chattels, the expansion of a
manufacturer's product liability and the existence of fair trade legislation
all constitute recognition in law that there is a special relationship between
manufacturers and subsequent dealers in their products, a relationship which
does not depend upon privity of contract for its existence. The areas of law
mentioned above illustrate the unity of interest which the various parties
have in a product even after it has passed out of their hands. All those who
are connected with the product, albeit on different levels, share a responsibility
for its availability and quality, and in this regard the acts of one affect the
others, both from legal and economic viewpoints.
1. The Indirect Purchaser Theory.—Both the FTC and the courts had
given some recognition to the existence of this relationship in Robinson-
e4 FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance 4-5 (1945).
65 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L.
Rev. 791 (1966).
66 Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1928).
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Patman cases prior to Meyer. Recognition of this principle is implicit in
the "indirect purchaser" theory, an early expansion of the concept of "cus-
tomer" beyond the confines of privity. 67 The indirect purchaser doctrine
expanded the meaning of customer to the point where only direct dealing,"
not privity through a direct sale," was required under the Robinson-Patman
Act. In effect, this doctrine provides that where the manufacturer retains
sufficient control over the operation of wholesalers in distributing to retailers,
then the retailers may be considered customers or purchasers of the manu-
facturer under the statute even though they purchase from controlled whole-
salers and not directly from the manufacturer."
In the development of the "indirect purchaser" doctrine, two cases are
particularly noteworthy in their relationship to Meyer." In Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp.,72 the FTC invoked the "indirect purchaser" doctrine for the
first time. Kraft-Phenix manufactured cheese and sold it to jobbers and
wholesalers. As a matter of policy, Kraft solicited retail customers for its
distributors and it regulated the prices at which the distributors could resell
Kraft's products. Kraft exercised an effective control over its products until
they arrived in the hands of the retailers. In its decision in an action alleging
a section 2 (a) violation, the Commission said:
A retailer who purchases [the manufacturer's] goods from jobbers
and wholesalers is considered by the Commission to be a "purchaser"
of [the manufacturer] within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman
Act as well as retailers buying direct. This is because of the fact that
[the manufacturer] recognizes the retailers buying through jobbers
as customers by personally soliciting them and by making effective
its price policies and schedules as applied to them. A retailer is none
the less a purchaser because he buys indirectly if, as here, the manu-
facturer deals with [the retailer] directly in promoting the sale of
his products and exercises control over the terms upon which he
buys."
Since Kraft's actions showed that it recognized indirect-buying retailers
67 Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 546 (1937).
68 "The Elizabeth Arden case is not contrary to this holding. There the manufacturer,
in furnishing demonstrator service, discriminated between retailers who purchased the
manufacturer's product from wholesalers and other retailers who purchased direct from
the manufacturer. A direct relationship existed between manufacturer and retailer." Skinner
v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 7G2, 765 (5th Cir. 1956).
69 See, e.g., Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1956).
79 Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
71 These two cases along with the two others mentioned below form a syllabus of
the development of the Robinson-Patman Act before the decision in Meyer. Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937) ("indirect purchaser" doctrine invoked for the first
time) ; Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953) (first application of the doctrine
to a section 2(d) case) ; K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(initial judicial acceptance of the doctrine) ; American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104
(2d Cir. 1962) (first application of the "indirect purchaser" doctrine in a proceeding
against a buyer under 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and § 2(d) of the
Robinson-Patman Act).
72 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
78 Id. at 546.
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as purchasers, the Commission decided that it would do likewise. The case
is significant because it established in 1937 (only one year after enactment
of Robinson-Patman) that the FTC would not be bound by too literal an
interpretation if a literal interpretation would undermine the congressional
intent behind the Act.
In •1961, in K.S. Carp. v. Chemstrand Corp.,74 the "indirect purchaser"
doctrine received its initial judicial acceptance. The case concerned a manu-
facturer of acrylic fibers who sold them to mills; the mills in turn sold them
to converters. As in Kraft, the manufacturer dealt directly with the retailer
in promoting sales and exercised some control over the intermediary mills. The
court stated that privity between the manufacturer and converter was not a
necessary condition for the converters to be considered purchasers under
the law." Thus, it held that the manufacturer violated sections 2(d) and
2(e) by granting promotional allowances and furnishing services to the con-
verters. In arriving at this decision, the court reasoned: " [T] he term 'customer'
used in Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act is to be given the same
meaning as 'purchaser' in Sections 2 (a) and 2(e) of the act, in order to
harmoniously effectuate the purpose of the parallel provisions.""
2. The Distribution Unit Theory.—The indirect purchaser theory is not the
only conceptual device which has been used to eliminate the requirement of
privity in cases which recognize the special relationship between a manu-
facturer and the intermediate dealers in his product. For example, another
approach which reaches the same result as the Meyer case, but differs in that
it attempts to stay within the literal confines of the language of the Act, is
the "distribution unit" theory. The major premise of this theory is that the
word "customer" implies a one-to-one buyer-seller relationship. The manu-
facturer-wholesaler-retailer distribution system is conceptually tailored to
accommodate the "customer" designation when either the supplier and whole-
saler are treated as a single seller or when the wholesaler and retailer are
treated as a single buyer. For example, in Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral
Corp." the single seller hypothesis was proposed to include a supplier and
its wholly-owned subsidiary distributor. The Court said: "The corporate veil
between parent and subsidiary distributor will be discarded when control
asserted by the parent is significant and they will be regarded as the same seller
for Robinson-Patman purposes.""
3. The Significance of Meyer.—In the indirect purchaser cases and in the
distribution unit cases, the element of control exerted by the supplier over
the subsequent purchasers was the key to the application of these doctrines.
This element of control is lacking in the Meyer case and therefore distin-
guishes it from the cases previously discussed. Nevertheless, at this point the
evolutionary trend toward Meyer can be clearly recognized. Despite a sub-
stitution of control for privity, a marked change in the traditional concept
74 198 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
75 Id. at 312.
76 Id.
77 256 F. Supp. 581 (1966).
78 Id. at 585. But see Nuarc Co. v. FTC, 316 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1963).
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of customer is apparent throughout the cases dealing with the indirect
purchaser and the distribution unit doctrines.
Before Meyer, however, even the control requirement was eased. The
FTC had accepted the view that if by its own actions the manufacturer
recognizes a buyer-seller type of relationship with the indirect-buying retailer,
then the FTC would consider this retailer a customer of the manufacturer
regardless of the amount of actual control exerted by the manufacturer over
intermediaries. This expansion of "customer" was made in the Sunbeam
Carp." case. This is probably the most significant case in terms of fore-
shadowing the direction of the Court in Meyer.
In Sunbeam, the respondent distributed its electric shavers directly to
certain retailers and indirectly, through appliance and drug wholesalers, to
other small retailers. Respondent devised a promotional plan through which
he offered uniform allowances to all competing retailers whether they were
direct or indirect purchasers. The plan did, however, require a minimum pur-
chase of $440. The FTC's complaint averred a violation of section 2 (d)
because the advertising allowances were not available to all retailers on pro-
portionally equal terms. The Commission found no discrimination and dis-
missed the complaint. However, in making its determination the FTC had
to consider whether the disfavored retailers were "customers" under the
statute. The Commission established that, although the product was sold to
the smaller retailer through a wholesaler, the promotional allowance in question
had been granted directly to the allegedly disfavored retailer by the manu-
facturer. From these facts the Commission drew the following conclusion:
As the direct and intended recipients of payments by respondent for
the promotion of respondent's goods under a plan devised and im-
plemented by respondent, these retailers were, we think, "customers"
of respondent within the meaning of the statute. Any other con-
struction would defeat the plain intent of Congress in enacting
section 2 (d)—to prevent sellers from discriminating between com-
peting resellers in the granting of advertising and other promotional
allowances.8°
Since here the manufacturer offered allowances to both direct- and indirect-
buying retailers, it would seem to be in line with the Kraft case where the FTC
said that since the manufacturer by its actions recognized indirect-buying
79 11963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. ¶1 17,178 (FTC 1965). It is worth-
while to compare Commissioner EIman's opinion in this case with his dissent in Fred
Meyer, Inc., I1961-1963 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 16,368, at 21,206 (FTC 1963).
In Meyer, he argued that the Commission's decision in Elizabeth Arden, 39 F.T.C. 288,
aff'd, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), should control. The Commission's order in Arden re-
quired the manufacturer to make his promotional services available "to competing retailers
on proportionally equal terms." 39 F.T.C. at 305. Commissioner Elman stated that the
majority refused to follow their earlier Arden decision because that case concerned § 2(e),
whereas the instant case, Fred Meyer, concerned § 2(d). He argued that this conclusion is
incorrect since it is inconsistent with the generally accepted view that §§ 2(d) and 2(e)
are parallel provisions and should be construed as such. Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-63 Trans-
fer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 11 16,368, at 21,231-32 (FTC 1963).
80 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. if 17,178, at 22,254 (FTC 1965).
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retailers as customers the Commission would do the same." However, the
Commission did not make this argument nor did it explicitly invoke the "in-
direct purchaser" doctrine; instead it apparently attempted to move away
from it. Although Sunbeam rejected the "indirect purchaser" fiction, the
decision was in line with Kraft in that both recognized the same economic
reality even though they expressed it differently. In "indirect purchaser"
cases, the FTC had stressed the number of contacts between the manufacturer
and ultimate purchaser and the control exerted by the manufacturer over
intermediary purchasers. 82 In Sunbeam, however, no control was exerted, and
the only contact between the retailer and the manufacturer was the product
itself and the offer of a promotional allowance. Thus, the element of control,
so necessary for invocation of the indirect purchaser doctrine, had now been
superseded by only a tacit recognition by the supplier that this retailer is
something akin to a customer and should be treated as such.
In arriving at its decision in Sunbeam, the FTC relied not on a fiction
but rather on the fact that to find that the indirect-buying retailers were not
customers would defeat the congressional intent behind the Robinson-Patman
Act. In doing so, the Commission based its decision on the same grounds as
the Court did in Fred Meyer. Thus, it seems that the Meyer case followed
the reasoning of the Sunbeam case, but because of the absence of tacit recog-
nition by the parties that the direct-buying and indirect-buying retailers were
equally entitled to allowances, Meyer carried the conclusions even one step
further.
An examination of the Robinson-Patman Act cases from Kraft through
Meyer is essentially a tracing of the historical development of the concept
of customer as used in section 2(d). The evolution of the meaning of this
word demonstrates that Meyer is not a drastic judicial revision of legislation
but rather an expansion of a flexible concept permitting the legislative purpose
behind the statute to be achieved regardless of changes in the economic
frame of reference.
The Court could have avoided a redefinition of "customer" by applying
either the indirect purchaser doctrine or the distribution unit theory in the
Meyer case. Also, it would have facilitated its determination of which party,
the retailer or the wholesaler, should receive the allowance. If the wholesaler
and the manufacturer are treated as one, then the only customer of this unit
is the retailer. However, the difficulties in application of these theories to
Meyer seem to outweigh any advantages available through their use. A com-
parison of the Meyer rationale with the distribution unit concept makes this
point clear. Most of the cases brought under the Robinson-Patman Act are
similar to Meyer in that there is no proprietary nexus between the supplier
and the wholesaler. In practice, then, the single seller theory will not apply
because there is no ground upon which to base the alleged relationship of the
supplier and the wholesaler.
The buyer corollary of this consolidation approach treats the wholesaler
81
 25 F.T.C. at 546. See also FTC Advisory Op. No. 143, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1[ 18,060
(1967).
82 See, e.g., K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ;
American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1962).
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and the retailer as a single entity—a distribution unit. This theory was ad-
vanced in the Monroe Auto Equipment Company 83
 case. Here the retail
customers of the wholesale distributors shared in the distribution of profits in
such a way that the parties formed a single unit and, therefore, the retailers
were considered to be "direct purchasers" for section 2 (d) purposes. In
the Fred Meyer case, unlike Monroe, this connection between the wholesaler
and the retailer was non-existent.'"
In its treatment of the retailer and wholesaler as a single distribution
unit, this theory does accurately conceptualize their relationship." However,
treating the retailer and wholesaler in Meyer as one customer rather than as
members of a marketing system seems to be an oversimplified fiction and thus
does not really solve the problem. In Meyer, the Court avoids all pretense
and simply states that, for the purposes of section 2(d), all competing retailers
will be considered customers of the suppliers if any competing retailers are
"customers."
IMPLICATIONS OF THE Meyer DECISION
The obvious implication of the Meyer case is that indirect-buying retailers
must be offered advertising allowances if allowances are offered to their
direct-buying competitors. The case may not, however, result in an increase
in the number of retailers who receive allowances; Meyer may actually have
the opposite effect. Because of the difficulties suppliers will face if they wish
to offer allowances to all retailers, many suppliers may decide to discontinue
providing allowances to the direct-buying retailers who presently receive
them.88 There are two ways by which manufacturers can offer allowances to
indirect-buying retailers in compliance with Meyer. The supplier can shift
the administration of the allowances to the wholesalers, or the supplier can
administer the program itself. Neither alternative is particularly attractive.
The majority in Meyer recommends that suppliers shift administration
of their programs to wholesalers. 87 There is a danger in this solution because
the wholesalers may absorb the allowances by charging the retailer higher
prices or simply may not pass the allowances on to the retailers. The supplier,
in attempting to prevent this result, might run "afoul of the Sherman Act."88
He might be regarded as effectuating a program of resale price maintenance
similar to the one which the Court found in Albrecht v. The Herald Co."
83 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. if 17,011 (FTC 1964), aff'd, 347
F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1009 (1966).
84 Nevertheless, in Meyer, the single buyer theory was argued in a more general way
by the FTC. This argument was based on the idea of a "distribution network." Brief for
Appellant at 9, FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Fortas accepted the FTC's view. 390 U.S. at 359. However, the Commission thought
that the wholesaler should receive the advertising allowances, whereas Justice Fortas agreed
with the majority in Meyer and bestowed them on the retailer.
85 390 U.S. at 359.
. 	 88 Millstein, Sections 2(d) and (e) Robinson-Patman Act—Compulsory Reciprocity ?,
37 Antitrust L.J. 77, 90 (1968).
87 390 U.S. at 358.
88 Id. at 361; see also Millstein, supra note 86, at 89.
89 390 U.S. 145 (1968). In Albrecht, the respondent, a newspaper publisher, sold its
papers to a wholesaler who in turn sold them to an independent newspaper carrier. Re-
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Justice Harlan, who dissented in Meyer, thinks " [i j t is difficult to see why
an agreement between supplier and retailer sufficient to insure that whole-
salers in the middle do not absorb promotional allowances would not constitute
a combination in restraint of these wholesalers."" Perhaps Justice Harlan's
conclusions will never be borne out, but many manufacturers will probably
reject this course of action because there is a substantial risk of antitrust
liability.
The alternative, administration of the increased program by the supplier,
is unattractive because administration is a costly, troublesome chore. Many
small suppliers who could comfortably administer programs for a few direct-
buying retailers simply cannot assume the burden of administering a program
which includes all retailers. Thus, one possible implication of the Meyer deci-
sion is that it may prevent small manufacturers from granting advertising
allowances because, with the additional expense of administering the program,
the cost may outweigh its value." Consequently, a supplier who previously
could afford to grant advertising allowances to selected customers, but who
does not have the financial means to grant them to all his customers must now
abandon his entire program. Furthermore, even those suppliers who could
afford to grant advertising allowances on the expanded scale required by Meyer
may not desire to do so because the increased expense of administering such
a program would be prohibitive. This result would be most likely to occur
where the manufacturer is forced to deal directly with the small retailers
when such retailers are actually too small and too numerous to make direct
dealing efficient."
Another undesirable consequence of Meyer is that even those suppliers
who can afford a wide scale advertising program will eventually expend money
for services which they do not want or do not need. 93 For example, it is easy
to visualize a small retailer who functions in a very stable market and whose
sales of a particular product would not increase regardless of the amount of
money expended on advertising. In this situation it is apparent that what the
supplier would be required to pay as an advertising allowance would be a
waste of money. One Commissioner of the FTC stated, even before the
Meyer decision, that the rulings of the courts and the FTC in the area of
advertising allowances may demand "a misallocation of economic resources
for wasteful or useless advertising." He conceded that the FTC is insisting
that allowances be given to retailers who cannot effectively promote the manu-
facturer's product."
By requiring suppliers to pay for services which are of no value to them,
the Act very obviously discourages the practice of granting advertising allow-
ances. This result, however, may well have been Congress' purpose in enact-
spondent was found liable in a treble-damage suit brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act
which charged a combination to fix the maximum retail prices at which petitioner could
sell respondent's newspapers. See 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 208 (1968).
00 390 U.S. at 361 n.5.
91 Millstein, supra note 86, at 90.
02 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 361 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
93
 Millstein, Cooperative Advertising, 7 Antitrust Bull. 873, 883 (1962).
Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reappraisal,
42 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 26, 28 (1962).
390
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: "CUSTOMER"
ing Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 95
 At that time, advertising
allowances were looked upon as concealed discounts." It was suggested in
testimony before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
that, if such were the legislative intent, then advertising allowances should be
abolished outright. The proportioning scheme was viewed as a compromise
because it was lacking in prohibitive force 97
Since Meyer may restrict their use, it is necessary to observe that adver-
tising allowances do have justifiable value. An advertising allowance is often a
payment for legitimate advertising services." As such it is beneficial to both
manufacturer and retailer and has its place in their business transactions.
Justice Harlan referred to these allowances as a "significant form of compe-
tition"" between suppliers. Thus, the view of promotional allowances taken
by Congress in enacting Robinson-Patman may not be entirely justified. It
may be argued that promotional allowances in some cases do serve a useful
purpose. Before these practices are abandoned perhaps their value should be
more closely examined.
Whether or not advertising allowances will in fact be abandoned is a
matter of speculation. The fact does remain, however, that if advertising al-
lowances are given to direct-buying retailers they must be made available on
proportionally equal terms to all competing indirect-buying retailers. In the
final analysis, this new rule seems better than the old because it implements
the congressional intent behind the Robinson-Patman Act by restoring
equality of opportunity to competing retailers.
ANDREW J. MCELANEY, JR.
95 Hearings on S. 4171 Before a Subcomm, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1936).
66 See, e.g., 80 Cong. Rec. 8126, 8127 (1936) (remarks of Representative Crawford).
87
 Hearings on S. 4171, supra note 9.5.
98 C. Edwards, supra note 57, at 158.
00 FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 362 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
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